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Chapter 5 
There’s more to thinking than the intellect 
  
Douglas P. Newton 
School of Education, Durham University, UK 
 
Abstract 
Emotions tend to be ignored when exercising thought. This chapter illustrates the 
interaction of moods and emotions with the purposeful thought commonly expected in 
the classroom. Often, moods and emotions are seen simply as impediments to thought 
but they also drive, shape and support it. This needs to be more widely recognized in 
the fostering of thinking processes. 
 
Introduction     
Thought and action frequently bear the mark of emotion, something which is accepted 
in everyday life: marriage, employment, pastimes, attire, are generally shaped as 
much by emotion as by reason, and writers make a living from the interaction (Oatley, 
2002). But, in the classroom, emotion is seen as sand in the works, an impediment to 
clear thinking, an unwelcome distraction, and something to be suppressed or ignored 
(e.g. Phelps, 2006). Assumptions like these are passed from one generation of 
teachers to the next but Neumann (2012, p. 8) has pointed out that, ‘the systematic 
exploration and analysis of selected aspects of our world relies on feeling [as much 
as] thinking, knowing, and learning’. Moreover, this exploration can be better for it. 
Lehrer (2009, p. 20) goes further: ‘If it weren’t for our emotions, reason wouldn’t 
exist at all.’ The brain’s emotional and intellectual systems are highly connected and 
communicate continually to promote what we believe are our best interests. 
Sometimes the partnership is harmonious, and sometimes it is not (Sylvester, 1994). 
 
The interaction between the intellect and emotions varies: at one extreme, the intellect 
may be the principal player (in what Immordino-Yang and Damasio (2007) have 
called High Reason); at the other, emotions dominate. Most thought is somewhere in 
between but this is not to say that it is irrational or that irrationality is acceptable 
(Fried, 2011). We have two systems looking after our interests. The emotional system 
is older, involuntarily and fast while the intellectual or cognitive system is younger, 
voluntary and relatively slow (e.g. Hänze, 2003). In his concern for fostering thinking, 
Dewey recognized that a sharp division between the intellect and the emotions was 
unhelpful, particularly when it ignored emotion’s contribution to motivation (Dewey, 
1938/1998). Motivation is, however, only a part of the picture: moods and emotions in 
the classroom also shape the nature and products of the intellect’s efforts. In spite of 
this, educationalists often confine their attention to the intellect.  
 
The emotional system 
The emotional system automatically appraises situations and notes what it perceives 
to be of personal consequence. What is of consequence depends on personal needs, 
values, beliefs and goals, some of which form in childhood and may not be entirely 
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conscious (Freeman, 2000). If such consequences are detected, the system prompts a 
response (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). This fast emotional appraisal and response 
system, often accompanied by a feeling, has survival value (Tooby & Cosmides, 
1990). Schwartz’s (1994) found two dimensions in people’s values, one concerned 
with achievement, power, and benevolence and another reflecting a need for 
stimulation, self-direction and security. Furthermore, these dimensions were almost 
universal. Where students lie on the dimensions depends on their needs, values, 
beliefs and goals and on the priority afforded them. Students also have tendencies in 
how strongly they respond and how well they cope. In addition, how emotions are 
perceived and expressed depend on cultural norms. For instance, there is a greater 
readiness to express emotions in ‘individualistic’ societies like the USA and Australia 
than in ‘collectivist’ societies like China. There are also particular differences. For 
example, in the former, it is acceptable to express pride but not guilt while in the 
latter, the converse is true. At the same time, a given society usually comprises 
several sub-cultures, each with its own acceptable emotional behaviours (Eid & 
Diener, 2001; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003; Matsumoto, Yoo and Fontaine, 2008).  
 
A distinction is usually made between moods and emotions. Emotions are generally 
short-lived responses aroused by specifics, such as a task, a teacher’s action, or a 
student’s behaviour. Moods, however, are generally longer-lasting and more diffuse. 
They are the emotional system’s response to perceptions of the current state of well-
being. For instance, a student who perceives her lot to be unremitting humiliation is 
unlikely to feel good about it and may take this enduring feeling from lesson to 
lesson. As moods and emotions change, however, people are subject to a varying 
stream of affect (e.g. Vandekerckhove & Panskepp, 2009). Very long-lasting affective 
states, extending over months or years, may be described as dispositions. Dispositions 
can bear in consistent ways upon cognition (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996).  
 
Moods and emotions are grouped in various ways. Frequently, they are classified as 
of positive or negative hedonic tone, according to whether they feel pleasant (e.g. 
contentment, joy) or disagreeable (e.g. sadness, sorrow) (Diener & Lucas, 2000). 
They may also be activating (e.g. joy, anger) or deactivating (e.g. sadness, 
contentment). A third way is to label them as approach-inducing (e.g. happiness, mild 
frustration) or avoidance-inducing (e.g. contentment, anxiety). On this basis, rage can 
be negative, activating and approach-inducing (Baas, De Dreu, and Nijstad, 2008). In 
practice, classifying moods and emotions like this is not always easy. Anger, for 
instance, is activating, it prompts approach but some are equivocal about its hedonic 
tone. As a consequence, some prefer to refer to particular moods and emotions and 
their specific effects. Nevertheless, grouping emotions according to hedonic tone, 
activation-deactivation and approach-avoidance, or even just one of these, usefully 
simplifies thought about the emotion-cognition space provided that the simplification 
is recognized.   
 
Some also refer to ‘academic’ emotions although it is unlikely that any emotion is 
unique to the classroom. The term may be construed to refer to common emotional 
responses to particular kinds of classroom events. For instance, there may be 
anticipation or anxiety generated by a particular activity, enjoyment or boredom in 
engagement with it, pride or disappointment in its completion, and admiration for or 
jealousy of others during the event. Thought, then, can amount to demanding 
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emotional labour in which emotions ‘profoundly affect’ engagement, performance 
and success (Pekrun & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2012, p. 259).  
 
The intellectual system 
The intellectual system is, in evolutionary terms, the younger system. It is relatively 
voluntary, more open to reflection, often effortful and slow, and is more limited in 
capacity. Under pressure, there can be a tendency to default to the emotional system 
for an answer. The intellectual system is what teachers hope to activate and the 
philosopher, Peirce, pointed out that this activation has purpose (Poggiani, 2012). 
Commonly expected in programmes of study or promoted by educationalists, 
purposeful academic thought is aimed at, for instance, the exercising of deduction, 
causal understanding, creative thinking, decision making, and critical thinking 
(Newton, 2014a).  
 
Deduction 
Here, deduction refers to logical inferencing which produces a consequence or 
conclusion from given premises or conditions in what could be formulated as an, ‘If 
this, then this follows’, sequence (Colman, 2003). Putting aside interactions with 
emotions, human deduction is not infallible because the intellectual system has 
limited capacity and people are inclined towards an economy of mental effort 
(Johnson-Laird, 2010).  
 
Casual understanding 
Understanding is the construction of meaningful, coherent wholes by inferring 
patterns and relationships within information and with prior knowledge. Causal 
understanding, inferring the relationship of cause and effect which enables the 
explanation of situations and events, is highly valued (Piaget, 1978) and teachers are 
widely urged to teach for understanding (e.g. Perkins & Blythe, 1994). The word 
‘cause’ may not always meet with approval; it is common in science where it explains 
the certain effects of natural laws but, when the same word is used in history, it refers 
to antecedent conditions from which events plausibly, but not inexorably, follow 
(Newton, 2012).  
 
Creative thinking 
Creative thinking refers to the construction of alternative worlds which includes 
constructing tentative explanations of events. Whereas causal understanding is the 
construction of cause-effect relationships which are commonly accepted in the 
academic community, a student’s creative thinking is expected to suggest plausible 
relationships which are at least novel to the student and where the teacher’s support is 
relatively limited (Newton, 2010a). Peirce called the construction of plausible 
hypotheses or tentative explanations, abductive inferencing (Peirce, 1923/1998). In 
some disciplines, creative thinking is usually called problem solving. 
 
Decision making 
Decision making (as practical wisdom or thinking for action) has also attracted some 
attention (e.g. Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Maxwell, 1984; Sternberg, 2001). It 
requires the construction of comprehensive understandings, courses of action to 
achieve particular ends, and the weighing of likely consequences in order to select an 
acceptable act (Baltes & Smith, 2008; Ryan, 1999). Often entailing a balancing of 
self-interest and the interests of others, it involves values, and moral and ethical 
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deliberation. Recognizing that such thought can be demanding, Labouvie-Vief (1990) 
called it ‘post-formal’. 
 
Critical thinking 
There are various views of critical thinking but, here, its purpose is taken to be the 
evaluation of thought to improve or judge its credibility (Moseley, Baumfield, Elliott, 
Gregson, Miller, and Newton, 2005; Newton, 2014a). It can involve interpreting, 
reconstructing, analyzing and judging what it appraises. Like other kinds of 
purposeful thought, it is not infallible and is open to bias (Newton, 2010b; Thayer-
Bacon, 1998).  
 
Various strategies are known to support these kinds of thought. For example, 
questions can initiate particular kinds of processing (Newton, 2012), dialogue in 
communities of enquiry has the potential to help students see other perspectives 
(Wegerif, 2006), and collaboration between students can foster critical thinking 
(Gokhale, 1995).  
 
These thinking constructs are familiar terms in education but they are neither single 
processes nor mutually exclusive. Any of them may call upon, for instance, deduction 
or understanding. Instead, each is distinguished by its overall purpose and the 
essential presence of thinking processes which satisfy that purpose. Accordingly, 
causal understanding and creative thinking will be used to represent thought which 
needs to be broad and constructive; deduction and critical thinking are used to 
illustrate thought which needs to be focused and systematic. Decision making will be 
used as an instance of thought in which emotions can be essential. But first, there is a 
need to describe a clear emotional effect which prompts someone to engage in 
purposeful thought. 
 
Emotion-cognition interaction 
Motivation and engagement 
Beginning with Dewey’s concern, the role of emotions in motivation, this is an 
obvious place where emotions make a difference: more than that, they determine 
whether there will even be relevant, purposeful thought. If a task appears to offer 
some satisfaction of personal needs (such as novelty, competence, a predictable 
world, affiliation) or supports a goal (such as progress towards a particular career), a 
student is likely to be motivated to engage with it. The possibility generates interest 
which prompts approach, engagement and effort (Pekrun, Goetz, Titz, and Perry, 
2002). And, of course, there are those who are motivated by a desire to avoid 
disagreeable consequences. Accordingly, the emotional system can generate a state of 
mind which inclines students to engage with or reject academic, purposeful thought 
(e.g. Newton, 1988; 2012). Mestre (2005) called approaches which exploit emotions 
in this way, pedagogies of engagement. An effective pedagogy of engagement 
involves the consideration of instructional and relational matters. Tasks are designed 
to have personal consequence and produce a satisfying success. The teacher shows 
enthusiasm, and provides an emotionally secure environment (Darby, 2005; Olitsky, 
2007). Enthusiasm is contagious; it attracts students to tasks to see what might be in it 
for them. An emotionally secure environment is one where students feel their 
thoughts, successful or not, are valued. The role of emotions in student motivation is 
manifest and has not been overlooked. Enthusiastic teachers are preferred and there is 
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a widespread belief that learning should be enjoyable (e.g. Berlach & McNaught, 
2007; Cheng & Mok, 2008; Newton & Newton, 2001).  
 
Once engaged, emotions provide feedback about the progress of thought. When it 
seems to be productive, feelings of pleasure and satisfaction maintain it; in effect, the 
emotions provide a green light and motivate continuation. If thought founders, 
feelings of frustration and impatience are a red light signalling a need for a change of 
approach (Isbell, Lair, and Rovenpor, 2013). In this way, emotions do more than 
simply attract someone to a task and encourage engagement. They also maintain and 
redirect lines of thought. But the kind of thought itself is also open to emotions.  
 
Broad, constructive thinking 
Constructive thinking requires, at least, attention, recall of relevant prior knowledge 
and an inferring of relationships (Yekovich, Thompson, and Walker, 1991). As the 
mind’s processing capacity is limited, a mental state which applies resources in a 
selective and sustained way, directing attention to what seems potentially significant, 
determines what patterns and relationships will be noticed. Matters which seem of 
personal consequence are particularly likely to attract attention until they prove 
otherwise. Attention can also be directed by moods and emotions brought to a task. 
For example, a sad mood can act like a filter which predisposes people to notice sad 
faces and gloomy language (Becker & Leinenger, 2011; Howe & Malone, 2011). On 
the other hand, happy students tend to see the bigger picture and are more ready to 
generalize while sad students focus on the details and particularize (Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2005). This directing of attention determines what information is active in 
the student’s mind and, hence, which connections are made. 
 
To recall something presupposes that it has already been stored in memory. Events 
which generate strong emotions are rarely forgotten; they are potentially of great 
personal consequence so storing them could be advantageous. This includes, for 
example, the events which produce embarrassment, regret or shame (Armony, 
Chochol, Fecteau, and Belin, 2007; Phelps, 2006). Nevertheless, the mind’s recall of 
such information is not always accurate; there is a tendency to inflate the emotion and 
the significance of the event, especially when the emotion was negative (Miron-Shatz, 
Stone, and Kahneman, 2009). At the same time, recall can be deceived by moods: a 
‘good’ mood inclines students to believe they have already studied something while a 
‘bad’ mood makes them more likely to deny it (Sergerie, Lepage, & Armony, 2007). 
In short, what students recall is partly determined by emotions and moods both at the 
time of storing the information and at the time of recalling it.  
 
Positive moods and emotions tell the student that the situation is safe and open to 
‘broaden and build thinking’. This favours causal inferencing which enables 
explanation (e.g. Clore & Palmer, 2009). When an understanding is slow to develop, 
those who begin in a positive mood are also more inclined to cast their net wider and 
supplement their information, possibly in an unconscious attempt to preserve their 
agreeable mood (Gasper & Zawadzki, 2012). More broadly, in narratives about 
people, empathy with the characters leads students to adopt their goals and construct 
causal explanations of events and behaviours (e.g. Bourg, Risden, Thompson, and 
Davis, 1993). Emotive material in general tends to be processed more deeply and this 
may be why there is more causal inferencing about the characters. It is not unusual for 
students to arrive with understandings they have constructed elsewhere. At times, 
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these are deficient or do not accord with generally accepted understandings which 
have to be taught. The students’ receptivity can depend on their mood and, again, it 
seems that a positive mood favours the changing of mental structures (Pimental, 
2011). 
 
Creativity is a kind of purposeful thinking which is popularly seen as involving 
moods and emotions. In particular, productivity in the creative arts is believed to 
stem, at least partly, from a desire to express or purge some emotional experience 
(e.g. Averill, Chon, and Hahn, 2001). In the classroom, however, Adler and Obstfeld 
(2007) recommend relying on the pleasant, activating, approach effect of interest to 
motivate students and foster creativity. Students in a positive frame of mind tend to 
look for the interest a task offers and, if they find none, re-interpret it in ways which 
supply interest (e.g. Stanko-Kaczmarek, 2012). Often, teachers set the problem or task 
but problem finding can also be a part of the creative process. Successfully identifying 
an intellectual problem can be exciting and motivating (Liggett, 1991; Ritchie, Shore, 
LaBanca, and Newman, 2011). What has been said about moods and emotions 
bearing upon the process of understanding can also apply to creative thinking. 
Certainly, positive moods can foster creative thought and problem solving probably 
because they tell students it is safe to take control, explore, experiment, even indulge 
themselves and make mistakes (Fredrickson, 2004; Kaufmann, 2003; Vosburg, 1998). 
(This is not to say that students in a mildly negative mood cannot be creative. They 
tend to approach the task in a different way and may produce (or express) fewer novel 
ideas but the students can be more persistent (Kaufmann & Vosburg, 2002).)  
 
Focused, systematic thinking 
Logical deduction is commonly seen as insensitive to moods and emotions. In 
mathematics, for instance, the content can be devoid of vested interests. For relatively 
simple tasks, this may be so and High Reason prevails. Where the task is other than 
algorithmic and simple, it often needs attention, interpretation and recall of prior 
knowledge in order to construct an appropriate representation. Emotional matters 
relating to attention and recall were mentioned above and apply here, too. Information 
(for instance, in the form of premises) tends to be interpreted in ways which are 
congruent with moods (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). In this way, and as with 
constructive thinking, what is processed in deduction and in critical thinking can vary 
with mood. Furthermore, a sad mood is known to promote careful, systematic 
reasoning. In the kinds of social reasoning expected in some disciplines, a 
consideration of the ‘beliefs, desires, and intentions’ of others is also more likely 
when in a sad mood (Converse, Shuhong, Keysar, and Epley, 2008: 725). Positive 
emotions, like happiness, can encourage a careless and disordered processing which 
lowers performance in step-by-step logic (e.g. Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Pham, 
2007). When the topic involves vested interests, it can generate emotions which 
prompt defensive thinking. Students can be reluctant to set aside long-standing beliefs 
when logic dictates that they should (Croker & Buchanan, 2011; Sripada & Stich, 
2004). To do so would be to admit error and lose face; it may also require a 
potentially disturbing and effortful adjustment of mental structures and behaviours. 
This illustrates that deduction can be sensitive to moods and emotions. In particular, 
success and quality of thought can be affected by the state of mind taken to the task 
and acceptance of conclusions by their implications for vested interests. 
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Usually very highly valued, critical thinking is also open to the effects of moods and 
emotions (Wade, 1995). For instance, negative moods can produce a tendency to be 
excessively critical (e.g. Efklides & Petkaki, 2005). There are also unconscious biases 
stemming from vested interests. These trigger the emotional system to favour an 
outcome which supports personal needs, values and goals: what makes the critical 
thinker feel mentally comfortable makes the mind less open than some would like to 
believe (Newton, 2014a). This biasing towards self-interest makes emotion look bad 
for critical thinking but, given that analysis is an important part of it, it benefits from a 
touch of sadness in what Andrews and Thomson (2009, p. 620) describe as ‘analytical 
rumination’. This, however, can lead to a tension between some kinds of purposeful 
thought in which critical thinking is embedded to ensure its quality. Creative thinking, 
and the generation of ideas in particular, can benefit from a positive frame of mind. 
The critical evaluation of those ideas is better done cold. The two kinds of purposeful 
thought are at their best under different conditions and an over-assiduous application 
of critical thinking can terminate the generation of ideas.  
 
Decision making 
Values − beliefs which lead us to favour certain behaviours and outcomes − determine 
what is perceived to be good or bad and can underpin a desire for a particular state of 
affairs. As Hume (1739/1978) so clearly saw, the intellect is used to achieve what we 
value and, therefore, see as good. Conversely, the passions pass comment on the 
intellect’s proposals so that what seems like a logical decision (e.g. accepting 
employment in a distant town in a prestigious company rather than staying in a 
backwater) may not feel right. The conflict between the two systems often reflects the 
intellect’s disregard of personal values so that what is logical may not promote 
personal well-being (Sylvester, 1994). When the ends have consequences for others, 
moral judgments about what is right and wrong are needed. Kant (1785/2002) argued 
that this was a matter for the intellect but psychologists find that, in practice, it is 
more a matter for the emotional system which presents its findings as valenced 
emotions which answer, ‘How do I feel about it?’ (e.g. Haidt, 2002). The process is 
quick and can handle complex situations. Here, in favouring outcomes with personal 
value, the emotional system reduces infinite possibilities to a manageable few 
(Haselton & Ketelaar, 2006). This is not to say that its prompts are always faultless: 
they are only as good as the person’s values. Emotions can also bias decisions; 
Schnall (2011) has demonstrated that, for instance, feelings of disgust makes 
judgments in general more severe.  
 
Broad speaking, constructive thought can benefit from moderately positive moods 
while focused, systematic thought benefits from moderately negative moods. In 
decision making, where matters of personal consequence are involved, the emotional 
system can be an essential part of it. Reality is, of course, rarely so simple; emotion-
cognition interaction can be complex but this serves to illustrate it is not necessarily 
bad for thought, provided that the moods and emotions are the ‘right’ ones. There is, 
however, also some truth in the popular belief that they can impede purposeful 
thought, particularly when moods and emotions are strong and when public 
performance is involved.  
 
Fraught thought 
It is common knowledge that strong emotions, like anger and euphoria, take mental 
resources from the task in hand (Pham, 2007; Stollstorff, Bean, Anderson, Devaney, 
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and Vaidya, 2013). Similarly, strong moods, like depression, can generate protracted 
rumination about past events which displace thought about current matters (e.g. 
Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Lynden, and Phillips, 2009). Emotions are also produced in 
threatening classroom situations. Responding to a teacher’s questions and contributing 
in group work can be sufficiently disturbing to generate a disabling anxiety or 
embarrassment which adversely affects performance (Rank & Frese, 2008). Oral work 
in modern foreign language teaching can produce emotional responses – something 
like stage fright – which are a significant barrier to learning (Horwitz, 2010). Krashen 
(1988) noted that such negative emotions (which he called affective filters) can be 
strongly disabling. Tests and examinations can also generate disabling anxieties 
which increase with age and reduce students’ attainment, making some students drop 
out of school (Connors, Putwain, Woods, and Nicholson, 2009; Segool, Carlson, 
Gosforth, Embse, and Barterian, 2013). The student’s self and public image and 
aspirations are threatened by such tests but the student’s responses are not inherently 
irrational. The emotional system is responding to perceived threats to values, beliefs 
and goals; where that response is moderate, it can keep a student alert and attentive 
but strong responses can overwhelm the intellect.   
 
Conclusion 
It is easy ignore an elephant in the classroom and be seduced by novel ephemera 
(Newton, 2014b). But thought is directed and shaped by fundamental forces of human 
nature which are ever present. When fostering or studying students’ thinking, it is 
important to recognize that the intellect is not everything, nor are emotions simply 
impediments to thought. The examples of purposeful thought described here are 
complex and often extend over time and are subject to a stream of affect. They can 
involve other kinds of purposeful thought which generate tensions between optimal 
thinking conditions and prevailing feelings. Nor can it be assumed that critical 
thinking will routinely correct deficient thinking: it is hard to be open-minded and 
impartial when matters of personal concern are at stake.  
 
Teachers need to be able to negotiate the emotion-cognition space so that the 
classroom’s emotional climate is conducive to productive thought. Given that 
emotions can determine educational outcomes, teacher training needs to recognize 
that teaching and learning is emotional labour, both for the student and the teacher. 
Teachers, often unconsciously, sense the state of mind of their students and the 
prevailing emotional climate but, at best, they deal with them unprepared. Teacher 
trainers should encourage forethought about emotion-cognition interaction in lesson 
planning. Those who would foster purposeful thinking also need to be aware that 
strategies used to activate thinking processes can themselves generate moods and 
emotions with the potential to affect, even nullify, that thinking. For example, it is not 
uncommon for teachers to have students collaborate in problem solving. Swain (2013) 
had students work together in pairs on a task in a second language which generated a 
sequence of small problems. These young students shared pride, pleasure, admiration, 
excitement and satisfaction as they explored possible solutions together. In the 
process, the stream of positive affect probably helped to make their thoughts 
productive. On the other hand, it is very common for teachers to try to initiate 
particular kinds of thought using questions. When this calls for a public response, it 
can generate a crippling anxiety in some students.  
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Those who would study purposeful thinking need to consider the extent to which 
moods and emotions could bear upon their investigations and whether affective 
variables should be controlled or reported. There is also a need for research on how to 
achieve a productive emotion-cognition partnership in learning environments. 
Strategies for handling the affective environment in a classroom would also be useful 
as ways of managing emotions in the laboratory are not always acceptable elsewhere.  
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